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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
networks are commonly deployed to aid the operation of
large industrial facilities. The polling mechanism used to
retrieve data from field devices causes the data transmis-
sion to be highly periodic. In this paper, we propose an
approach that exploits traffic periodicity to detect traffic
anomalies, which represent potential intrusion attempts.
We present a proof of concept to show the feasibility of
our approach.
1. Introduction
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
networks are commonly deployed to aid the operation
of large industrial infrastructures, including some consid-
ered essential for our society, such as water treatment and
power generation facilities. Given their critical nature, se-
curity plays a very important role, as the impact of attacks
could be catastrophic.
In this context, the use of Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) is of paramount importance to track down malicious
activities. While misuse (or signature) based approaches
are essential to deal with known threats, anomaly based
methods are necessary to identify novel attacks. Anomaly
detection methods characterize the “normal” behavior of
the network and identify deviations, that is, anomalies.
Anomaly detection systems have been proposed for dif-
ferent aspects of SCADA systems, from communication
protocol level [3] to process level log mining [5].
SCADA networks are deployed to monitor and control
devices in the factory floor. To accomplish this goal, data
is continuously retrieved from these devices, so that a real
time view of the infrastructure’s processes can be estab-
lished. Typically, data is retrieved through an automated
polling process, in which requests are sent to field devices
every predetermined interval. A side effect of this behav-
ior is that traffic patterns tend to be highly periodic.
Previous work [1] shows that SCADA traffic is indeed
highly periodic, and in this paper we propose an approach
that leverages this observation to perform anomaly detec-
tion. Our goal is to protect the network services that are
accessed in a periodic fashion, by reporting variations in
this behavior. Note that although, many attacks can dis-
rupt the traffic periodicity, changes in the traffic periodic-
ity are not necessarily malicious. In this work, we focus
on find such disruptions, however identifying their cause
is out of the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we explain in more details how periodicity
manifests in the network traffic and discuss the effects of
attacks on the periodic behavior. In Section 3, we discuss
our anomaly detection approach. A proof of concept is
described in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we present
our conclusions and propose future work.
2. Periodicity and Attacks
2.1 Network Traffic Periodicity
SCADA networks typically exhibit network connec-
tions with periodic bursts of packets, that is, a fixed num-
ber of packets being transmitted at fixed intervals. These
bursts are formed by the periodic requests for data sent by
clients and by the replies sent back by servers. Network
traffic with periodic behavior has two important charac-
teristics that determine its normal appearance: the period
(or frequency) and size (i.e., number of packets) of the pe-
riodic bursts it contains. It is important to note here that
some non-periodic activity, or noise, is expected when ob-
serving periodic traffic. Noise can be caused by various
factors, such as network delay, packet loss and retrans-
mission, protocol specific exchanges (e.g., TCP’s 3-way
handshake), etc.
Not all network connections in a SCADA network nec-
essarily show periodic characteristics. For example, if a
PLC is commonly accessed manually, non-periodic be-
havior can be expected. In this paper, we are interested in
network traffic that, in its normal behavior, consists only
of periodic bursts of packets.
2.2 The Effects of Attacks
Our assumption is that many intrusion attempts disturb
the traffic periodicity. To motivate this assumption, we
describe attacks from some of the different categories pro-
posed in [6] and discuss how they would impact the traffic
periodicity. Our examples are taken from an open access
list of real-world SCADA attacks signatures used in the
Quickdraw Intrusion Detection System [4]. The list in-
cludes signatures to protect Modbus TCP1 and DNP32,
two well-know standards for SCADA communication.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider in the following
examples that traffic exchanged between client and server
is periodic.
Information Gathering attacks may precede other at-
tacks and are an attempt by the attacker to gather as much
knowledge as possible of the target system. A typical way
to acquire this information is through scans, like the Mod-
bus TCP Points List Scan. Scans require a large set of
possible addresses or ports to be tested and, hence, are
usually performed as fast as possible by the attacker. Such
scans could be detected as the generated traffic is clearly
not periodic. Note that, if the attacker performs the attack
in a slow but periodic way, we might still be able to de-
tect it, as it would either be seen as a new frequency or a
change in the amplitude of the service’s normal frequency.
Denial of Service attacks prevent a legitimate user to ac-
cess a service or reduce its performance. For example,
the DNP3 - Unsolicited Response Storm attempts to over-
load a DNP3 server by sending a number of unsolicited
response packets, normally used to report alarms. In case
the attacker sends a large amount in a short time, this at-
tack could be seen as a large spike in the amount of non-
periodic traffic. Similarly to a scan (see above), the attack
could be performed slowly, however with reduced effec-
tivity.
Network attacks manipulate the network protocols. For
instance, the Modbus TCP - Clear Counters and Diag-
nostic Registers attack uses a single packet with a specific
code function to clear counters and diagnostics registers
in a SCADA server, in an attempt to avoid detection. We
cannot detect most attacks of this type, as they are ex-
ecuted through just a few packets, and therefore do not
disturb the traffic periodicity. We could, however, detect
some of the effects of such attacks. For example, the Mod-
bus TCP - Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay at-
tack consists in answering every request with the “device
is busy” message preventing a reply timeout. While we
do not expect a change in traffic periodicity in this case,
the typical answer could consist of multiple packets in-
stead of just one, as in the attack, causing a change in the
amplitude.
Buffer Overflow attacks try to gain control over a pro-
cess or crash it by overflowing its buffer. For example, the
Modbus TCP - Illegal Packet Size, Possible DOS attack
sends a single packet with an illegal packet size, exploiting
a bug in the implementation of the protocol stack. Again,
1http://www.modbus.org/
2http://www.dnp.org/
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Figure 1. Diagram of our approach
our method is not designed to work for attacks consisting
of few packets, but in case the attack is successful and the
targeted system crashes, the normal traffic patterns will be
clearly disrupted.
In summary, many attacks cause one of three changes
in the frequency domain: (1) new or missing periodic
burst frequency; (2) change in periodic burst size; and (3)
increase in the amount of noise.
It is important to stress that our goal is the detection
of anomalies, i.e., deviations from the normal periodic be-
havior of the traffic. Such deviations are not necessarily
malicious. For example, a manual access to a PLC for
testing purposes would cause a spike in the non-periodic
traffic and, consequently, trigger an alarm.
3. Our Approach
In this section we provide a high-level description of
our approach. A proof-of-concept implementation is dis-
cussed in Section 4.
Our approach for anomaly detection consists of four
modules, depicted in Figure 1. In the first module, traf-
fic from the SCADA network is passively monitored in a
central point, where it is analyzed. In this module, packets
that are not relevant to SCADA processes, such as DNS
and DHCP, are filtered.
The second module task consists in creating network
flows, i.e., aggregating packets in a meaningful way. In
the this work, we propose to aggregated traffic using the
server-side transport port, as it identifies the network ser-
vices we intend to protect. Although the server trans-
port port is sufficient to isolate the periodic traffic in the
traces analysed here, additional aggregation keys might be
needed in other scenarios. For instance, if a service is ac-
cessed by two different clients, one using polling mecha-
nism and the other not, it would be necessary to add client
address as an aggregation key in order to isolate the pe-
riodic behavior. Another alternative is to isolate the peri-
odic bursts using application level information. In prac-
tice, the best aggregation method is dependent on the ap-
plications and protocols in use.
Flows are stored as time series, i.e., for every fixed in-
terval P, the number of packets belonging to a specific
flow is stored. We define sampling frequency SF as
SF = 1/P . The choice of SF is a trade-off between
accuracy and performance. The higher the frequency, the
more detailed information about the flows is stored, and,
in consequence, more data needs to be processed.
Before performing the detection, we must learn the
normal behavior of the system. This is the objective of
the periodicity learning module. In this step we extract
the two characteristics discussed in Section 2.1: the pe-
riod (or frequency) of the periodic bursts and their size.
These characteristics can be extracted, for instance, by the
AUTOPERIOD method proposed in [7]. Our assumption
is the periodic bursts characteristics of a service do not
change over time, so this analysis can be performed off-
line, and its results validated by network operators.
Once a flow can be matched to a frequency fingerprint,
i.e., a flow for which the ”normal behavior” is known, it
is monitored for anomalies. In Section 2.2, we identified
different types of anomalies that can be detected. If an
anomaly is identified, an alarm is raised. Ideally, alarms
should provide sufficient information so that a corrective
action can be executed. For instance, if a new periodic
burst is identified in a flow, the alarm needs to provide de-
tailed information on the source of this burst. Alarms are
also fed back to the periodicity learning module to support
adaptive learning if a fingerprint needs to be updated.
4. Proof of Concept
We show the feasibility of our approach by implement-
ing a spectrogram based anomaly detection module, as a
proof of concept of the core function of our approach. The
traffic capture is emulated by using data collected in a wa-
ter treatment facility, also used in previous works [1, 2].
Only TCP packets to a few commonly utilized ports were
considered. The main reason for this choice is to reduce
the amount of data that needs to be analyzed, as most of
the process is done manually.
Using TCP connections enables us to identify the
server ports that clients connect to, observing the 3-way
handshake used to establish the connection. The client al-
ways initiate the connection, sending a SYN packet to the
port to which the server is listening. Although there is no
fixed direct mapping from ports to network services, it is
fair to assume highly used ports at servers represent a ser-
vice. In practice, this analysis allows us to build a list of
services (ports) available at each server and its respective
clients, which we use as basis for the flow creation.
In our proof of concept, the periodicity learning con-
sists in selecting services that present periodicity with in-
tervals above 1 second. From our interview with the op-
erators, we know that applications should not perform
polling with a smaller interval. To perform this task we
generate a periodogram for each of the flows. The pe-
riodogram is a power spectral density estimator defined
by the squared length of each Fourier coefficient, which
can be calculated with a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
Through manual inspection of the periodograms, we se-
lect the ones with high energy frequencies bellow 1Hz for
the anomaly detection phase, and discard the others.
The anomaly detection method consists in tracking
changes in the periodic behavior. As the periodogram
does not provide time localization, it is not suitable for the
task. Instead, we use the discrete-time Short-Time Fourier
Transform (STFT), i.e., we apply a sliding window to the
data and perform a FFT on each slice. A spectrogram can
be constructed by plotting time in the x-axis, frequency
in the y-axis and the squared magnitude of the STFT as
a color. The spectrogram provides a visualisation of how
the energy content of the different frequency bands vary
over time, making it possible to observe: (1) changes in
the set of high energy frequency bands, indicating changes
in periodic burst intervals; (2) changes in the amount of
energy in the same set, indicating changes in the periodic
burst size; and (3) increase in the amount of noise, in this
way covering all anomalies we are interested in.
The sliding window method has two parameters: win-
dow size and step size. The window size determines the
number of samples within a window. Its value is a trade-
off between frequency and time localization. In a FFT, the
number of samples given as input in the time domain is the
same as the number of the discernible frequency bands in
the output. Note also that the spectrogram only has 1 data
point in the time axis per FFT. Therefore the use of large
windows causes a good frequency localization (high num-
ber of discernible bands), but bad time localization (small
number of data points in the time domain).
The step size parameter determines the number of sam-
ples the window moves per FFT. By using small steps one
can cope with large windows, as it increases the number
of data points in the time domain. However, small steps
also mean that the time series for two consecutive FFTs
are very similar, as they will have a large overlap.
We selected two flows to illustrate the use of spectro-
grams to visually detect anomalies. An arbitrary 5-hour
slice of the trace was used in the analysis. The flows are
generated with a 10Hz sampling rate, and packets are ag-
gregated based on server port and direction (to server or
from server). Several combinations of window size and
step size were tested. Figure 2 shows the time series and
spectrogram plots for the selected flows. For the sake of
visualization, we set them to 300s and 18s, respectively, in
the results presented here. In addition, the frequency axis
range is selected to clearly display the anomalies.
Figure 2a shows the time series for all traffic sent to
service 1. A few peaks are present in the time series. As
any other non-periodic activity, peaks in the time domain
cause an increase in noise in the frequency domain, as the
energy is spread over the spectrum. The effects of these
peaks are clearly visible in the spectrogram for this same
flow (Figure 2b). Another interesting behavior is the inter-
mittent activity at around 0.95Hz. The spectrogram sug-
gests a periodic burst of packets at this frequency, but not
for the whole duration of the sample. We are not certain
of the causes of the behavior.
The second row of Figure 2 shows the more well-
behaved traffic sent for a different service 2. The spectro-
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(b) Spectrogram - service 1
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(d) Spectrogram - service 2
Figure 2. Detecting Anomalies
gram shows two main frequencies at 0.2Hz (and its integer
multiples, or harmonics) and 0.5Hz. However, an increase
in the noise level can be identified after 15:00. A closer
inspection of the data reveals that this increase is due to
small variances in the periodic burst interval. While be-
fore 15:00 the bursts are constantly 5s apart, after 15:00
the interval slightly varies in the range 4.8–5.1s, an ex-
pected variation when considering the fact that small net-
work delays are common.
The results shows that the spectrogram can be used to
localize frequency anomalies in the time domain. How-
ever, to serve as a deployable anomaly detection system
the analysis has to be automated. One of the possibili-
ties we currently explore is to use the power distance [7]
metric to compare two consecutive bins of a spectrogram.
This metric is shown to be useful when comparing the pe-
riodic structure of two sequences. A large distance be-
tween consecutive bins would indicate the presence of
anomalies. The main drawback of this approach is that
it does not allow the differentiation between the 3 possi-
ble anomalies identified in this work. Furthermore, initial
tests indicate that the power distance might be too sensi-
tive to period variations like the ones shown in Figure 2d.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We propose an anomaly detection approach based on
the observation that SCADA traffic is highly periodic.
The implemented proof of concept shows the feasibility
of the approach, however further research efforts towards
automation of the approach are necessary. The major chal-
lenges are finding an optimal traffic aggregation strategy
to characterize the periodic behavior and dealing with nor-
mal variations in the periodic bursts period caused by,
among others, network delays.
Furthermore, we will validate the approach with more
datasets and test its effectiveness in the presence of realis-
tic intrusion attempt scenarios.
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